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rule 10700
avaiL It sets
serious and wilful
as follows:
Failand wilful
waived
may
continuance.' Continuance of
lJOt
for failun\ to plead ·wilful misconduct \vith
required by the rule.''
foregoing reasons I would annul 'the order.
Petitioner's application for a reheariug· by the Supreme
was denied June 12, 1936. Gibson, C. ,J., Carter, J., and
, J., were of the opinion that the application should

[L.A. No. 23697.

In Bank.

May 22, 1956.]

BENE.B'ICIAL J!'IRE AND CASUALTY INSUHANCE
COlVIPANY (a Corporation), Respondent, v. KUR'l'
UITKE AND COMPANY, INC. (a Corporation), Appellant.
Insurance-Agency for Insurer-Actions-Offer of Proof.1n an action by an insurance company against a general
for declaration of rights under a writtPn contract relatto the agent's compensation, where the trial court had
previously indicated that it would receive no extrinsic evidence of any kind bearing on construction of the contract,
defendant's offer of proof that the parties construed the contract to mean that sums paid rnonthly to defendant were fully
that plaintiff never demanded a return of such sums
they showed in a deficit position, and that under trade
eustom and usage earned commissions are never returnable,
was sufficient, though general and somewhat vague.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3] Insurance, § 33;
Appeal and
§ 184; [4] Evidence, § 414; [5] Evidence, 399; [6] Evi§ 410; [7] Contracts, § 161; [8] Usages and Customs, § 6.

defendant a iitatement
record
all losses and loss expense
pny defendant all commissions shown
"earned'
the
and that
defendant was to be covered by subsequent
extrinsic evidence should have been
the contract was ambiguous as to whether any
of the commissions paid defendant were returnable to plaintiff.
141 Evidence-Extrinsic Evidence-In Aid of Interpretation.The fact that a
questions the meaning of certain words
clauses in an agreement shows that it is ambiguous so as
extrinsic evidence
the other party to aid in its
[5] !d.-Extrinsic Evidence-In Aid of Interpretation.-When the
used in a >vritten contract is fairly susceptible to one
extrinsic evidence may be considered,
the terms of the agreement but to aid
the true intent of the parties; not
meant something other than was said
hut to show what
meant
what they said.
[6] !d.-Extrinsic Evidence-Surrounding Circumstances.--Where
auy doubt exists as to the purport of the parties' dealings as
in the wording of their contract, the court may look
to the circumstances surrounding its execution-including the
nature and
matter of the agreement-as well
acts or declarations of the parties shedding
of their mutual intention at the time
of

[7] Contracts-Interpretation-Function of Trial Court.-When a
rontrnct is in any of its terms or provisions ambiguous or
it is primarily the duty of the trial rourt to construe it after a full opportunity afforded all the parties to
circumstances and conditions
evidence of the
its execution and the conduct of the parties relathereto.
[ ~] SPe Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 279; Am.Jur., EvidPnce, § 1151.
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BENEFICIAL

defendant was to be at its risk and the
defendant to
not later
after the end of the calendar month in which
was written. (Pars. 4 and 6.) Plaintiff could
any risk submitted and defendant was not to be entitled to any eommissiou
7.) Plaintiff was
not to be "
" for any of defendant's expenses in
the agency.
9.) Defendant was to provide
inspection and
losses claimed to
under policies and cooperate with plaintiff in settlement of losses. (Par. 13.
Paragraph 14 deals with defendant's compensation as follows : ''On or before the 30th
day of each month, the Company [plaintiff] will compute
all premiums earned during the previous month and will
furnish the General Agent [defendant] with a statement
thereof, together with a record of all losses and loss expense
paid and of all reserves for loss incurred on a case basis.
At such time the Company shall remit to the General Agent
all commission earned during said previous month. In the
event the cornp1dation of cornm1·ssion earned at the end of any
regular monthly adjustment period res1tlts in a deficit against
the General Agent, this deficit shall be fully covered by a
subsequent commissio1~ earning before any earned commission shall be dtte the General Agent." (Emphasis added.)
Paragraph 15 provides that defendant agreed to accept as
compensation in full for its services and plaintiff agreed to
pay compensation to be determined as follows: "From the
gross earned premium under all policies of insurance ...
there shall be deducted the following items: (a) losses and
allocated loss adjustment expense; (b) a fixed charge by the
Company of a sum equal to 20% of such gross earned premium; (c) from the residue remaining shall be paid a sum
as commission to the General Agent not to exceed 30% of the
gross earned premium." Loss adjustment expense is defined
as the "allocated" overhead cost of defendant in the adjustment of each claim and is subject to review and in the event
of dispute it shall be settled by arbitration. The last sentence of that paragraph provided: "As soon after December
31 of each calendar year as practicable, the underwriting
profits arising out of the net retained business under this
contract shall be computed and 50% thereof shall be payable
to the General Agent. That retainrd business shall be defined
as the net amount of risk assumed by the Company after
deducting quota share reinsurance.'' If the parties could not
uv''""o"' were to be

any and all amounts due the
added par. 19.)
trial court determined that defendant's
to be determined under paragraph 15 of the contract;
14
for "interim monthly payments
on account
''; that under paragraph 19
determination of the compensation was to be fixed
had been earned
after the term
written had expired) and all losses had been
and that defendant's compensation vYas contingent in
whether defendant received any compensation at all deupon a favorable loss experience under the policies
which could not be determined until all losses had
and loss adjustment expenses had been paid and
earned. That as a
to cancellation of
any
made to defendant under
be recovered by plaintiff only out of commJb:SJIUH~ later earned and payable to defendant but that after
of the contract defendant must repay to plaintiff
of the sums received under paragraph 14 which
the amount necessary to pay losses and the other
mentioned in paragraph ]5. In other words, the trial
decided that \Yhile the contract was still in effect decould
the commissions paid to it monthly under
14 and would not be persomllly liable to return
but if they were too much, as shown by later
any overpayment could be deducted from the monthly
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but at the end of the
liable for any
be deducted from commissions found to
final
were treated like
advances on commissions for which defendant would be ultiliable if
exceeded the commissions in fact
in
that defendant
alone bore the risk
of whether it would be paid
for its services or for
1he expense of operating the agency business.
DefendaJJt contends that none of the commissions
to
it monthly under paragraph 14 are returnable to plaintiff
and that if the contract is not unequivocally subject to that
eonstruction, evidence offered by it to explain the contract
and indicating such construction shcmld have been admitted.
Plaintiff, of course, contends the trial court's construction
was correct and there was no ambiguity in the contract.
[1] Defendant offered to prove: (1) That the parties
c~ollstrued the contract during the time it was being carried
out as urged by defendant and to that end plaintiff's vice
president would testify, as he had by deposition, that the
sums paid monthly to defendant were fully earned and not
returnable at any time and that plaintiff had never demanded
a return of those sums although they showed iu a deficit
position; (2) that under trade custom and usage in the insurance business with respect to general agency contracts,
in ·which both parties were engaged, earned commissions are
never returnable. 'l'he trial court rejected the offer. "While
the offer of proof is general and somewhat vague it is suffident. 'rhe trial court had previously indicated that it would
re(~ei ve no extrinsic evidence of any kind bearing upon the
l:om;truetion of the contract. [2] \Vhcre an entire class of
eYillenee has been declared inadmissible or the trial court
has clearly intimated it will receive no evidence of a partiettlar class or upon a particular issue, an offer o:f proof is
not a prerequisite to raising the question on appeal, and an
offer, if made, may be broad and general. (H eirnann v. City
of Los Angeles, 30 Cal.2d 746 [185 P.2d 597]; Lawless v.
Calaway, 24 Cal.2d 81 [147 P.2d 6041; Cmwinetti v. Pacific
M1lf. Life Ins. Co., 23 Cal.2d 94 [142 P.2d 741]; Estate of
Kearns, 36 Cal.2d 531 [225 P.2d 218].) As said in the
Kearns case: ''At the hearing on the petition :for instructions
the trial judge stated that the will was not ambiguous and
that he did not wish to hear any extrinsic evidence. Aceonlingly, 110 witnesses were called, but a statement was made
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f46 C.2d 517; 297 P.2d 428]

could
asserts that some of the evidence which
could produce is not relevant and that
under section 105 of the Probate Code.
discuss in detail the different items
it is apparent from the record that reto the admission of any extrinsic evidence
was the pnrpose of the court to exclude all such
the statement made by appellants did
amount to a formal offer of proof, none was necessary
tl1e trial com·t har1 declarrd the will was unambiguous
intimated that no extrimde evidence wonld
recein1d." (P. 537.
Extrinsic evidence shonld have been admitted. 'l'he
was ambiguous. CWith regard to the trade nsave,
is not necessary; this is later discussed.) The
(·ontraet could mran that the sums paid defendant monthly
not retnrnable except possibly out of commissions earned
the future either before or after cancellation. Paragraph
supra, provides that plaintiff was to compute the premiums
during the previous month and give defendant a
statement thereof together with a record of all losses and
lose; expense and all reserves. At that time, plaintiff, and
on the basis of those records, was to pay to defpndant all commission sho>vn to have been "earned" during
previous month. If from snch regular monthly adjustperiod there is shown a deficit against defendant, it
to be covered by subsequent or future commissions, that
from them. Paragraph 15, snpra, could nwan that
it dealt only with the method of computing defenilant's comor compensation and not as indicating that any earnecl
('ommission:;; paid monthly were to be returne<l. Paragraph
fL supra, could refct· only to the method of arriving- at rciil drtermining the commission and the snhsequent
there mentioned could refer onl,,- to a dednRtion
future commissions of any overpayment of commi:;;sions.
this is paragraph 19, supra, which provides for
cancellation bnt reserves, in evrnt of cancellation. the prowith regard to eompensation, and, as to those proplaintiff agT('<'S to pay defendant awl defendant to
all amotm ts tl ue to the other·. Thi:;; eonld mean. as
indieated
tlw trial court. that an aecounting was to be had
in \Yhieh all of the monthly eommission paymrnts wonlcl be
rerxamined and that any difference between the partirs off-

not to vary or
but to aid the court in
intent
. . . not to show that 'the
meant someother than what
said' but to show 'what they
meant by what
said'.
[6] Where any doubt exists
as to the purport of the
in the
of their
to the cirsurrounding its
matter of the
acts or declarations of the
light upon the question of their mutual intention at the time
of contracting' . . . . To this latter point, it is said that 'a
construction given the contract by the acts and conduct of
the
with knowledge of its
before any controversy has arisen as to its meaning, is entitled to great
weight and
when
be adopted and enforced
the court.' (Woodbine v. Van
29 Cal.2d
104
[173 P.2d 17].
"
33 Cal.2cl 416,
422
P .2d
" 'Once
has to be read into
a contract to make it
it can hardly be said to be susceptible of
one
It would have been error
for the trial court to read
"to find a clear
in an
and
done so exclude the extrinsic evidence on the
ground that as so construed no ambiguity exists.''' (Union
Oil Co. v. Union Sugat· Co., 31 Cal.2d 300, 306
P.2d

to trade usage it is clear that both parties
in the business of issuing and selling insurance
that connection in
arrangements for a general
Aside from other
the phrases "earned com, alone, referred to in paramay have a
meaning
may mean that snch commissions are
entitled
ascertained at the
events. 'fhis
Inc ... 19 Cal.
" . . . while words in a contract
to be construed
to their
ordior
meaning, as the case may be,
if in
the subject matter of the contract, particular
have by trade usage
a different meaning,

& Co.
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sense
tradn usage.
Parol evidence is admissible to establ ifih thn tnH1e usagr>, and
that is true even though the words are in their
or
entirely unambiguous, inasmuch as
reason
of tlw usage the words are used
the
in a different
sensP. (See Code of Civil
§ 1861
§§ 1644, 1646, 1655;
Lind Co. v. Bower &
194; Callahan v. Stanley, 57 Cal. 476; Higgins v.
Petroleum etc.
120 Cal. 629
P. 1080] Cm·o
Mattei,
39 Cal.App. 253 [178 P. 537] ; Wigmore on Evidence, vol.
IX, § 2463, p. 204; Restatement, Contracts, §§ 246, 248; 89
A.L.R. 1228.)" In Bocly-Steffner Co. v. Plotill Products, Inc.,
63 Cal.App.2d 555 [147 P.2d 84], the court held that evidence
of custom and usage was admissible to show that a contract
phrased as one of sale was considered one of ageuc•.y only.
The court there said: "It is a rule of practically uniwrsal
acceptation in common law juri:.;dictions that however elear
and unambiguous the words of a particular contraet may
appear on its face it is always open 1o the parties to the
contract to prove that by the general and accepted usage
of the trade or business in which both parties are engaged
and to which the contract applies the words have acquired a
meaning different from their ordinary and popular sense.
( Civ. Code, § 1644; Code Civ. Proc., § 1861; Hest., Contracts,
§ 246 (a) ; 2 Williston on Sales, 2d eel., § 618, p. 1556 ; 3 Williston on Contracts, rev. eel., § 648, pp. 1871-1872, § 650, pp.
187 4-1879; 9 Wigmore on Evidence, :3d ed., § 2463, p. 204;
25 C.J.S., Customs and Usages, § 24, pp. 111-112; 17 C.J.,
Id., § 61, pp. 498-499; 12 Am.Jur., Contracts, § 237, pp. 762763; note 89 A.L.R. p. 1228, et seq.)
''The rule is clearly and simply stated in the He:.;tatement
of the lJaW of Contracts, Reetion 246, Comment on Clause (a)
in the following language: 'The rule stated in the Clause
is not confined to unfamiliar words or to words often used
ambiguously. Familiar words may have different meanings
in different places. A usage may show that the meaning of a
written contract is different from an apparently clear meaning which the writing would otherwise bear.'
''Thus, for example, such an apparently clear expression
as 'one thousand' may be shown by a trade usage to mean
more than the number one thousand (Smith v. Wilson, 3 Barn.
& A dol. 728, llO Eng. He print 266) or less than that number

Co .

.W. :j20]), and
similar nsage, be shown to inclnde
(1880), L.R 1 Ch.
their contraet may f~videnc0
the usage. But the mere usc
\Yhic:h is
facie inconsistent with the usage
hdd to show an intent not to be bound by the
·where the usage
to that very language a
from that whieh would normally he ascribed to it. ..
H'S
in the canned
trade
as
cuter into a contract
an~
l_v· accepted usage of the trade m that
the terms and language actually used in
contract a particular meaning and legal significance,
that meaning may be at variance with the normal
and
which would be given to that
in the absence of proof of the usage of the trade."
thm tlw

It shonld be dear, tlwrdore, that extrinsic evidenc(; was
here as an aid in construing the contract. 1'he
by i he parti<>s to the contract since its existencr
thereunder, the preliminary nrgotia1 ion.~
the question of whether custom and usage in the
insn
bnsinrss has given meaning to the terms of the
ermtrnct are all relevant to the interpretation of it :mel should
ennble ihc trial court to ascertain the meaning of the contraci
all that clefendant ofl'ered to 11roYe will be
and a(lmissible cannot. of eourse, br now determined.
upon the natun~ ancl r;haraetnr of tlw proof
made.
is rnvnrsed.
(

.T..

Shenk, J., 'rrayuor, ,J., Schauer,
,L pro tem., concurred.

Chairman of Judicial CounciL

~f.,

Sywnce,

